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Also see List MPs
and Accountability Jack Vowles Professor of Comparative
Politics Victoria University of Wellington University of Exeter University of Auckland |
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One of the biggest bones of contention in the debate
about MMP was accountability: most simply, the ability to 'throw
out the rascals' when voters have had enough of them. Much of the
debate was about accountability of governments, but accountability is
also important for individual MPs. Following this line of argument,
arguing against MMP, the Campaign for Change highlighted the ability of
some defeated electorate MPs to return to Parliament on their party's
list. This is a matter now addressed in the review of MMP. But are list MPs actually harder to 'throw out'
generally, because of this 'parachute'? And
is it more difficult to 'throw out' MPs in general under MMP than under
first past the post (FPP)? It may surprise
many people, but the answer to both questions is 'no'. |
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Many people who dislike MMP probably think that list MPs
can stay in Parliament indefinitely as long as they keep their 'party
bosses' happy. But the job of being a list MP, particularly for a small
party, is often not a secure one. If we define accountability in terms
of MPs losing their seats, there has been more accountability of this
kind under MMP than there was under FPP. In the 17 FPP elections since 1946, an average of 20% of
MPs lost their seats or stood down. In the four post-MMP elections the
comparable rate was 25%. This is consistent with evidence from other
countries: party lists generate more voter-driven circulation in and
out of parliaments than takes place in single-member district elections
under FPP. Accountability of list MPs is through their parties. If
voters do not like the performance of a party's list MPs, they can
withhold their support for that party. For this reason parties drop llst MPs whose actions bring themselves and
their party into public disrepute, as recent New Zealand cases can
attest. Replacements of list MPs between elections add a further
element of fluidity. This may be as a result of scandal or allegations
of illegal conduct, or simply because of retirement from politics. But
note: these shifts are additional to the voter or election-driven
statistics of parliamentary change provided above. |
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Defeated electorate MPs who
return on the list do attract a certain amount of popular ire. But
these sentiments focus on a small number of cases. There are not enough
of them to offset the greater voter-driven movement into and out of
Parliament that takes place as a result of MMP's party lists. |
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Research shows that most electorate MPs lose their seats
because of swings against their party, rather than for their
performance as MPs. Analysis of election
results shows that some lose even though having increased their share
of the vote compared to their result at the previous election. Most of
these defeated MPs get more electorate votes than their party's vote in
the electorate, and some poll well above it. |
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Over half of the defeated electorate MPs who have stayed
in Parliament on the list did not contest the next election. Some have
stood down before it. Some have refused to take a list position at the
next election and have simply tried to recapture their electorate.
Parties often rank defeated electorate MPs lower on the list at the
next election, in less winnable positions. Some defeated MPs who retained a list seat have
demonstrated continued local support by winning when they have
contested subsequent local government elections. Some defeated electorate MPs who survive on the list do stay on
longer: but they are a minority, and are valued by their parties for
their representation of groups that support them, and by many of those
who vote for those parties. If accountability is about the ability of voters to throw
out MPs, MMP is no worse than the alternatives, and better than most of
them. The MPs who are hardest to 'throw out' are those sitting for
electorate seats that are traditionally safe for their party. The
proportion of such seats would almost certainly grow under the first
past the post, supplementary member, or preferential voting systems. Further information documenting this analysis can be
found in a paper downloadable at – http://www.jackvowlesdomain.co.uk/Accountability_MMP.pdf |
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